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The force set out on Monday, October 5th. (Both Baker and Froissart state that the departure was hurried.24 October was late for the beginning of a campaign.) It followed the road along the valley of the Garonne through Langon as far as Castets en Dorthe, then struck southward through the 'landes' to the neighbourhood of Arouille, thus:
On Monday to Villeneuve d'Ornon…. 4 мили
Tuesday to Castets en Dorthe……25 миль
Thursday to Bazas……………….10
,, Friday (rest)………………………0
„ Saturday to Castelnau……………..11,5
,, Sunday to Arouille ………………25
Baker comments on the two longer marches for they both caused the 'loss of many horses'. The animals may have been overloaded or overdriven. More probably they were suffering from 'transport fever', a condition still found in horses that have been moved long distances by ship or rail. The malady commonly occurs about three weeks after they have reached their destination and, unless quickly treated, proves fatal.
During this first week, the troops and horses were subsisting on food brought from Bordeaux or bought on the journey. Hay was bought at Ornon, hay and oats at Castets en Dorthe, corn and wine at Bazas, meat at Castelnau. Some wine was also bought for the Welsh troops and a large sum was paid in compensation for damage done by these men at Castets en Dorthe.26
The force was now approaching 'enemy territory'. In the open country near Arouille, the column was divided into three corps.27 The vanguard was placed under the command of the Earl of Warwick and Sir Reginald Cobham with John Beauchamp, Roger (afterwards lord) Clifford and Sir Thomas Hampton who was the standard-bearer.
The main body was commanded by the prince with whom were the Earl of Oxford, Bartholomew de Burghersh, John de Lisle, Lord Willoughby de Eresby, Roger de la Warre, Sir Maurice Berkeley, John Bourchier, Thomas Roos, and three Gascon lords, the Captal de Buch, John Sire de Caumont and Aimeri de Biron, Sire de Montferrand.
The rearguard was under the command of the Earls of Suffolk and Salisbury, and with them was Guillaume de Pommiers, leader of the Bearnais.
From this point onwards the march assumes a different character. New knights have been dubbed (as was common before battles); standards have been unfurled; the force moves in three corps which may act separately, one or two being detached for work or for night quarters at a distance from the main line of route; the purchase of provisions ceases; pillage and destruction begin;28 armed resistance may be met.
Since, however, such resistance was slight, and an account of the campaign tends to be a rather repetitive narrative of minor incidents, we shall trace the route followed, indicate the speed, and pause to consider the situation at Toulouse, Carcassone, Narbonne and Carbonne. Finally, we shall review the campaign as a whole.
The territory lying immediately ahead of the army was (in Baker's words) the 'famous, beautiful and rich' land of Armag-nac.29 Sloping down from the foothills of the Pyrenees towards the Garonne, its surface deeply furrowed by many tributaries of that river, it was a fair land. It was, moreover, the domain of the lord whose policy had been so hostile to the English cause.
During the two days the army spent near Arouille the first acts of war occurred. The town was regained for the English side and the troops were allowed to go out to take victuals and forage and to set fire to properties on enemy territory. On Tuesday (October 13th) the fighting began. Three towns were taken and burnt, the fort of Estang was captured, the castle of Monclar surrendered and troops entered the town. It was a satisfactory start and the more experienced leaders probably recalled two commonplaces of the camp: the storming of fortresses is costly in human lives; one of their group. Sir John de Lisle, had been fatally wounded. Secondly, soldiers who spent a night in a captured, walled town incur grave risks: in the darkness, Monclar went up in flames. The prince escaped but, during the remainder of the campaign, where there was no monastery or castle available for his quarters, his tent was erected in the open.30
After two days' pause, the forces advanced on Friday (16th) to the fortified place, Nogaro, and on Saturday, reached Plaisance. From this town the civil population had already fled, but the Count of Montluzon and other lords had remained in the castle. They were captured by the Captal de Buch.31
Here the main army stayed all Sunday while one corps turned westwards, took by assault the castle of Galiax and burnt it. Plaisance which had sheltered the army for two nights, was burnt on Monday and the force moved eastwards along the road leading towards Auch, the capital city.32 The easterly direction was maintained at the cost of crossing ridge after ridge and river after river, mainly, it may be supposed at fords and, as (according to Froissarf) the summer had been dry,33 the water-courses probably presented no serious obstacles. The average day's journey was however only about eight miles.
By Monday evening the army reached Bassoue. This was church property (it belonged to the Archbishop of Auch) and completely respected: only the officers in charge of victualling were allowed to enter. On Wednesday (21st) the army passed near Montesquiou, came down to the bank of the Blaise at Mirande, a well garrisoned town belonging to the Count of Comminges, and the prince had his quarters in the Benedictine abbey of Berdoues, a little distance upstream. The abbey was already deserted but its goods and fabric were respected. As for the town of Mirande, though the army remained near it all Thursday, it was apparently not taken. The soldiers are said to have rested and it is likely that no attempt was made to gain possession, for a siege would have taken time and an assault would have been costly in lives.34 Moreover, the road from Montesquieu to Mirande led away from Auch. Auch also was not to be besieged.
On Friday (23rd) the prince and his troops left Armagnac. Circumstances which he could not foresee caused him to traverse another part of this county a few weeks later but, in view of the declared purpose of the campaign, it is convenient to consider his achievement. In a letter written at Christmas to the Bishop of Winchester, the prince stated that he had ridden 'through the land of Armagnac harrying and wasting the country, whereby the lieges of our most honoured lord (the king) whom the count had before oppressed, were much comforted'.35 Baker's terse narrative supplies no details beyond those already quoted. Froissart makes no reference to this region at this time. Wengfeld says, 'My lord (the prince) hath ridden through the county of Armagnac and hath taken there many walled towns and hath burnt and destroyed them, save certain towns which he hath strengthened. And then he went into the county of Riviere and took a goodly town which is called Plaisance and which is the chief town of the land and he burnt and destroyed it and all the country round about.'36 In short, there had been no substantial resistance anywhere. Such French forces as were in the south-west were either local garrisons without cohesion, incapable of holding up the English invasion, or the royal troops under the command of the Constable and the Count Jean d'Armagnac. The latter had been at Agen on the day the prince left Bordeaux but had withdrawn to the east.37
If the troops kept mainly to the route described by Baker, they had covered a distance of about eighty miles; they had spent ten or eleven days in the county and they were sufficiently numerous to have done a great deal of destruction and consumed or carried off a considerable quantity of food.
But neither in the prince's letter to the Bishop of Winchester nor in Wengfeld's letter is there any pause after their references to Armagnac. From the continuity of the narratives, it would be inferred that while the avowed, primary aim of the campaign had been achieved, the prince was pursuing other ends, not declared but probably well understood by the bishop and certainly clear enough to himself and the English and Gascon leaders. It may be judged that the enterprise on which they had embarked was deemed to be prospering, that it was carried forward by its own momentum, that the leaders felt strong enough to risk an encounter with a French army and adventurous enough to desire some fighting. They decided to advance eastwards still crossing the ridges and the rivers in spite of the difficulties of the march. They may have had Toulouse in mind.
Passing into Astarac, the force reached Seissan on Friday (23rd) and here occurred an instance of indiscipline important enough to be recorded (by Baker): notwithstanding the prince's strict orders, the town was fired and could not be saved.38 As in Armagnac, the news of his advance spread far in advance of his columns. Inhabitants fled before his troops arrived, but left stores of food. On Saturday (24th) the three corps camped separately, the vanguard at Toumans, the main body at Simorre (in the valley of the Gimone), the rearguard at Villefranche (a mile upstream), each having victuals without the trouble of foraging.39
On Sunday (25th), continuing eastwards, they saw Sauveterre on their left, passed by but did not take the fortified town of Lombez, forded the Save and spent the night in the large deserted town of Samatan. On the following day, the town was burnt (and a convent in it) and the army entered the domains of the Count of Comminges which they ravaged with fire and sword, crossing the rich, well-cultivated plateau of Touch, passing through Sainte Foy and reaching Saint Lys for the night (26th).40
They were now within a dozen miles of Toulouse. In that large, fortified town were concentrated the forces of the Count of Armagnac and his fellow-lords whose duty and interest lay in opposing this invading army which had spread havoc in their territories.
What form the opposition should take lay with the count to decide. The French could come out and compel the prince to fight a battle in the open or, by staying within their walls, they would compel him to lay siege to their town. Both forces, of course, employed 'coureurs' and, as intelligence came in, it became evident that Count Jean had made preparations: the bridges over the Garonne had been broken down; the many houses outside the city walls had been destroyed so that besieging troops would have no shelter. Jean intended that the prince should not pass Toulouse. He was awaiting an attack from the west.
Tuesday (October 27th), described by Baker as a rest day, was a day of decision. Having come so far and with such ease, what was to be the ultimate objective? To continue the march eastwards was to go straight to Toulouse. If the Count of Armagnac emerged, a battle, it may have been felt, would turn in then-favour. Even so, unless the town capitulated forthwith, there would have to be a siege; and sieges, if they lasted more than a few days, were wearying operations calling for artillery and costly assaults. If, however. Count Jean did not emerge, the siege would be even longer. Small fortresses—provided they did not command river crossings—might be by-passed by keeping out of bow-shot or by risking casualties. But Toulouse was not a place of that kind. It was the capital city of the region, the focus of communications, the natural rendezvous for French troops, the only point at which the Garonne could be crossed (if anybody even considered a crossing desirable); and its garrison was commanded by the man whose 'oppression' of English subjects had formed the ostensible (and perhaps the real) reason for the direction the campaign had taken. To by-pass Toulouse—were it possible— would be contrary to military prudence. In any case it would not be possible, for a great river barred further advance eastward. If the chevauchee was too enjoyable to be dropped, then the force might turn north, south or west. It could not go east.
The English decision was audacious to the point of the foolhardy. Had it failed, posterity would have treated it with contempt. Its success has led historians to leave it unnoticed in a campaign lacking military interest. The decision had a threefold boldness. The great fortified town should be by-passed with all the risks involved in leaving a powerful hostile garrison in the rear at the only bridge left standing. The great river should be crossed without the aid of a bridge; in fact two rivers should be crossed in one day with a ten-mile march as a prelude. The crossings should be made at points where Jean d'Armagnac—if he had the will— could station his archers and men-at-arms on the opposite bank and kill his enemies as they struggled through the waters or sought to climb ashore.
Great speed, pluck and discipline were needed—and good fortune. 'There was never a man in our host that knew the ford there, but by the grace of God, they found it,' wrote Wengfeld.41 They found a ford (probably between Rogues and Pinsaguel, a little above the confluence), marched the troops ten miles to it, got them across the great river—men, horses, baggage-carts—moved forward a couple of miles, plunged into the Ariege, a narrower but swifter river, crossed that also and made their camp at La Croix Falgarde, all in one day (28th). The prince stated that the two rivers were 'very stiff and strong to pass', and admitted that he had had some casualties.42 Baker described the Garonne as 'swift, rocky and terrifying', the Ariege was 'still more dangerous than the Garonne'.43 Wengfeld made the situation clear: 'Our enemies', he said, 'had broken down all the bridges on the one side of Toulouse and the other, save only the bridge in Toulouse, for the river goeth through the midst of the city.' There were great forces, he continued, in that city, yet the English troops had effected the passage.44
Audacity had succeeded. To Jean d'Armagnac such a movement of troops was probably unthinkable for, as Baker says, 'never till this day had horsed troops crossed these waters. That is why the people in the district, panic-stricken, unwarlike in temperament—for they believed they were secure behind their rivers—not knowing what course to take and unable to flee, made no resistance.'45 And Jean himself had opposed no resistance! In a single day the strategic situation had been completely changed. The prince could now—if he wished—penetrate deep into Langue-doc. It had been a memorable achievement and should still be regarded as noteworthy.
The night following this daring and exhausting movement was spent at La Croix Falgarde.46 An attack on Toulouse from the south may have been considered and rejected. Some slight demonstration (probably a reconnaissance in force) within view of the city walls was apparently made, and there was pillage and burning in the locality.47 But the leaders' aim was to proceed eastward and, though the evidence does not warrant the inference that they had in mind a firm objective, they followed the eastward route across southern France for another week. The 'land of Toulouse' was described as 'very rich and plenteous'.48 The three corps were often employed on separate tasks and numbers of small towns and small strongholds were easily gained.49 Baker supplies the main itinerary. On Thursday (29th) they moved through Castanet and in the evening camped on the bank of the Hers at Montgiscard. The town had been taken by force at the cost of some casualties. It was, of course, plundered and burned. Froissart tells the story in his usual style and then adds an unexpected note of pity for the fate of the men, women and children of this town.50 Two spies, captured in the town, reported that the Constable of France was at Montauban hoping that the prince's army would be held up in a siege of Toulouse.51
The next day (30th) the prince advanced along the old Roman road, the Via Domitia, through Baziege and Villefranche to Avignonet. The inhabitants had fled before his arrival and the various corps were quartered in the town and suburbs for the night. Some of the richer people had taken shelter in the castle but it was taken by storm and they became prisoners. There followed the usual pillage and destruction and here, as also at Montgiscard, the soldiers burnt some windmills.52
On Saturday (31st) the army burnt Mas Saintes Puelles with its Augustinian abbey and reached Castelnaudary, a large town, feebly fortified but stoutly defended. It was taken by storm amid much butchery. Its men were held to ransom or, if they declined, they were manhandled.63 Sunday (November 1st, the feast of All Saints) was a rest day for the army but some of the men went out and gained possession of a town whose inhabitants purchasedtheir security by a payment of 10,000 gold florins. Castelnaudary, town and castle, was subsequently burnt and with it a church, two convents (of the Friars Minor and the Carmelites) and the hospital of St. Antony.64 Monday (2nd) was spent in a march through Saint Martin la Lande, Las Bordes and Villepinte to Alzonne, and on Tuesday (3rd) the force reached the important town and great fortress of Carcassonne.55
Here, as in several other towns in southern France, human habitations and military protection were very clearly separated in space. The town (le Bourg) of Carcassonne, rich, large and defenceless stood on the left bank of the Aude, the castle (la Cité) on the right, the two banks being connected by a stone bridge which had not been broken. The town was well stocked with wine and provisions; refugees had poured in from all the countryside and, as the army drew near, very many of them had gone with such valuables as could be carried, to the Cite in which already the burgesses had stored much of their portable wealth.
In the light of their experience, the leaders would conclude that the town could be taken without serious difficulty and both the prince and Baker in their terse narratives, imply that the army entered an almost deserted town and took up its quarters without opposition.56 Froissart, however, states that chains had been stretched across the streets and that the townsmen—bidaus armed with lances and bucklers—strenuously resisted the attackers; that the English horsemen dismounted and with banners and pennons flying, leapt over the chains and, sword in hand, fought the bidaus while archers poured arrows into the bucklers and in the end, the bidaus withdrew across the bridge to the Qt6.57 This may be a magnified version of a minor episode. The army lodged in the town in safety and had plenty of food and wine.58
There remained however the Cite. Situated on a hill rising to 150 feet above the level of the bridge, this immense bastion was one of the most formidable essays in military architecture of the period. Its double row of towers and lofty walls enclosed a small fortress-town which dominated the eastern exit from the Bourg. If it were adequately provisioned, it might resist a siege for months. A halt of such duration was not in keeping with a chevauchee. Moreover, a force which, in spite of broken bridges, had crossed the Garonne and the Ariege could readily find a way across the Aude—if indeed a further eastward advance was desired. It might even use the stone bridge and risk the showers of arrows which would pour down from the Cite. And it might consider the situation which would arise if large French forces should be assembled in its rear. Possession of the Cite was not at all indispensable, but it would be advantageous to the prince: it would increase his military security, his wealth and his prestige.
A further factor needed consideration. Though the inhabitants had deserted the Bourg, they were near at hand; though they could not prevent the destruction of their town, they could, and did, offer to negotiate terms for a payment in return for which the town should be spared. During Wednesday and Thursday (4th and 5th), while the army rested, representatives argued over the terms. On the side of the Carcassonnais the sum of 250,000 ecus d’or was proposed in return for the preservation of the Bourg from fire. To this offer was added a plea from the local clergy that the prince would not allow the town to be burnt or to suffer any further damage, but neither the inhabitants nor the clergy could negotiate the surrender of the Cite.59
The offer was rejected and the rejection deserves consideration. It was an immense sum, far greater than would be available in the town for immediate payment and probably greater than could have been raised quickly by loan in the circumstances prevailing in Languedoc in the autumn of 1355. Baker does not say the sum was insufficient. He regards it as irrelevant: the prince's purpose was not to raise money but to demonstrate the justice of his cause. He also holds that the apparent steadfastness of the occupants of the Cite in their loyalty to the French king was really fear of his vengeance. Though these statements are obscure, they merit examination in the light of the circumstances. There may well have been reasoning among the French that terrible as was the immediate power of .the prince, a cbevauchee was a passing phenomenon; that sooner or later (as in Normandy in 1346), French authority would be restored and therefore (on the level of expediency) resistance would prove better than surrender. On the other hand, the Cite was impregnable; time was on the side of its commander; there is no ground for doubting his fidelity or that of his garrison to the French crown; the prince was obliged to bear in mind the certainty that French armies were moving to meet him. With great reluctance, the fact that the great military prize would not be gained, had to be accepted.
Under the circumstances a bargain over the commercial town must have been unacceptable. While the prince was well aware that the hope of financial gain animated a large part of his army, he himself might be regarded as inspired by loftier or, at any rate, different motives. Furthermore, though in the inconsistencies of human affairs it was expedient to connive at various practices in the troops, he himself had not, so far, been a party to a sordid transaction of the kind proposed. In the light of Edward Ill's claim, the people of Carcassonne had to be regarded as his father's subjects and, since they offered resistance, as rebels and therefore his father's enemies. As Edward's lieutenant, he could not bargain with them. Their proposal was refused with haughty disdain.
No more time was to be wasted. Instructions were given that on Friday morning the town should be burnt, with the usual provision that church property should be respected. The destruction, however, was complete.
Froissart says that the army crossed the bridge over the Aude and that, in passing the foot of the hill on which the Cite stands, it was assailed by great stones flung by the artillery of the fortress. He may be referring to a section of the troops.60 It is unlikely that an attempt was made to take the whole army out by that route. Baker says the army withdrew (recessit) and its journey that day was 'heavy-going, stony and marshy'.61 It was no longer on the Roman road that it was marching, but along the left bank of the Aude and soon along the southern edge of the lake of Mar-seillette. Trebes was burnt; the surrounding country was devastated and quarters for the night were found or made at Rustiques (November 6th). After skirting the lake of Marseillette, the force passed through Serame (which it did not destroy: the town belonged to a friend of the prince) and reached Canet (November 7th). On Sunday (8th) it crossed the Orbieu in two sections, one passing over an unfinished bridge at Villedaigne, the other using a ford at Raissac d'Aude and, after a journey over the hills between Moussan and Bizanet, it reached Narbonne.
This town, famous since Roman days, had enjoyed great commercial importance but the approach from the sea was becoming more and more difficult for large vessels as the channel gradually silted up. Though its maritime importance was diminished, it remained a flourishing trading center in the midst of a prosperous region. Stone bridges spanned that arm of the Aude which still flowed, in declining volume, through the town.
It resembled Carcassonne in that its Bourg and its Cite stood on opposite sides of the river. The Cite was well fortified, garrisoned, and equipped with artillery capable of projecting missiles into the Bourg. It was believed that quantities of gold, silver and jewels were stored within its walls and that it also sheltered rich men whose capture might lead to the payment of big ransoms. Treasures and ransoms, however, could not be gained without a siege.
When the army approached Narbonne, the women and children moved into the Cite. The invading troops fought their way into the Bourg, took their quarters in the houses and enjoyed the large stores of food and wine, but a shower of missiles flung by the balistae in the Cite, poured into the Bourg by night and day. Among the casualties was Jean de Pommiers. Clearly the town could not be occupied for long without serious losses. Several heavy assaults were made on the Cite on Monday and Tuesday (9th, 10th) but all were stoutly repelled. Withdrawal, therefore, became imperative. The city was fired and the soldiers made their way through the blazing houses into the open country, followed by the Narbonnais who managed to smash and pillage some of the prince's wagons. Held in among the retreating English soldiers were prominent Narbonnais whom the prince had taken as hostages. They had to accompany the troops as far as Cuxac d'Aude where those who could pay suitable ransoms were released. The remainder were executed.62
The withdrawal from Narbonne (November 10th) was a check to a force which had enjoyed for so long an easy passage through French territory. Since, as we have stated, it is not possible to infer what ultimate objective the Anglo-Gascon leaders had in mind, or indeed whether they had any definite objective, it is not possible to reconstruct fully the situation confronting them. The Gascon lords who had asked King Edward to send his son to Gascony and who had pressed him to attack Armagnac, had had their wishes fulfilled. The power of the French king had been flaunted by a daring incursion deep into his territory, inflicting great injury on his subjects. Fear of the prince's approach had spread across southern France causing the inhabitants of Mont-pellier and even Avignon to prepare their defences. With friends gratified and enemies insulted and injured, some aims, it might be held, had been achieved. As for the knights and archers, manyof them had journeyed nearly three hundred miles from their homes to the English seaport. They had now travelled a similar distance from the French port and were maintaining themselves from the abundant supplies of a fertile region and enriching themselves with plunder. No serious opposition had been met. Yet opposition there must be, for the French king could not allow the work of devastation to continue with impunity. Moreover it was almost mid-November. As the winter advanced, even hardy troops would need warmth and shelter at night.
From different sources but almost at the same time, news arrived that King Edward had landed in France, that the pope wished to communicate with the prince and that French forces were massed in the prince's rear. Only a little later it was reported that French troops were moving from Montpellier.
Two bishops riding from Avignon had sent a messenger to ask for a safe conduct in order that they might deliver the pope's request that the prince would negotiate with the king of France. The request was in keeping with papal policy throughout the period. Letters were in fact sent to all four earls and to others in the prince's circle and to Jaques de Bourbon, Jean de Clermont and other French nobles begging members of both sides to use their influence to bring about a truce. Moreover, the prince had been empowered to make a truce. On the other hand, the moment chosen was inopportune. The bishops were informed that they should confer with King Edward and, in a letter written six weeks later, the prince described the episode in terms which emphasized the correctness of his procedure.64
Correctness also appears in the major decision of policy for the force under his command. A French army, prisoners revealed, had at last taken the field and was following the Anglo-Gascon army in the direction of Narbonne. 'We took counsel whether we might best withdraw,' wrote the prince, 'and we turned again to meet them.'65
From Narbonne, the most eastward point reached in the raid, the prince's troops had marched northwards. They had paused before Cuxac d'Aude (which was fortified), completely destroyed Ouveillan (November 11ith) and a detachment had begun a siege of Capestang. Negotiations were started for the payment of money in return for which the town should be spared, but at this point news was received of French forces near at hand in the west and of a force moving from Beaucaire in the east. The Council's decision was made: operations at Capestang were discontinued; the army turned westwards.
The change was one of direction rather than of method. For the moment it was necessary to face the French army and from now onwards, the ultimate objective is quite clear: it is to reach the march land near Bordeaux with as much of the accumulated booty as can be convoyed without endangering the column. But the practices of the great raiding force remained unaltered. The devastation continued; prudence alternated with boldness in the choice of route; there were days of hunger and discomfort and days of feasting plenty; at its own pace, it made its way back to its base.
On leaving Capestang, the leaders expected that the French and English forces would meet in battle within three days, and at Homps (November 12th) they learned that officers of the Count of Armagnac had actually spent the previous night there. Why Armagnac did not stand and force a decision must remain a matter for conjecture. Whether the prince could have overtaken him as he withdrew towards Carcassonne must equally remain undetermined. (The English army had had a very difficult march on Wednesday (November 11th), along stony roads where they could get neither food nor water for cooking. Only wine and oil were available and the horses had actually been allowed to drink wine.) After leaving Homps, the army split into groups. The town of Pepieux and the castle of Redorte were taken and the main body spent the night (November 12th) at Azille where a great store of muscat wine was pillaged.
The journeys made on November 13th and 14th are most difficult to trace. According to Baker, that of the 13th was long and extremely wearying. It passed over rocky roads where no water could be got and ended in a camp made wretched by lack of water and lack of shelter. On 14th, he says, they crossed their former track. By Sunday (15th) the route is quite clear again. The most recent French scholar holds that from Azille the prince, determined to avoid contact with Armagnac's army, made a detour northward via Siran, Laliviniere, Ventajou, Peyriac, Villalier, Conques, and camped his three corps in different places near Pennautier for the night of Saturday (14th). That is to say, he passed north of Carcassonne.
On the following day (Sunday, 15th) a part of the troops moved westward along a good road through rich, open country, passing Montreal and increasing its speed because the prince was to be entertained in the great religious house of the Friars Preacher at Sainte Marie de Prouille. Here the prince and many of his suite were admitted to the brotherhood and a very substantial gift in cash was presented on behalf of the prince by Richard of Leominster, one of the Friars Preacher who had accompanied the expedition from England.67
Meanwhile another part of the army swept round southwards sacking and burning Limoux, Lasserre, Fanjeaux (with its score of wind mills) and Villasavary.
The combined force proceeded on Monday (16th) to Belpech where town and castle were quite separate. The former was taken by force, the latter surrendered. But Belpech was spared damage by fire, for it belonged to the Count of Foix.
Travelling westward on Tuesday morning (17th), they reached the valley of the Hers where news of the prince's approach had preceded him. The friars had made ready their hospitality at Prouille and awaited him. Today the Count of Foix awaited him and gave him a cordial reception at the abbey of Boulbonne. Count and prince spent several hours together riding downstream mainly through the count's domains and, as Baker puts it, 'out of respect for the count and his neighbours, there was a truce to fires on that day'.68
The Ariege was crossed again and the main body camped at Miremont which they subsequently burned. A short march on the 18th brought them to the Garonne at Montaut where, at normal times, ferry-boats were available for a crossing. The boats had of course been removed but, to the astonishment of the inhabitants, the feat of three week's earlier was repeated. Heavy rain was falling and the men learned subsequently that had they arrived one day later, the flood waters would have rendered a crossing impossible. Baker attributed the success of this second hazardous venture to divine providence. Without a pause, they moved up the left bank. One detachment actually recrossed the Garonne, took Marquefaue and returned, while the remainder advanced to Carbonne, took it by assault and lodged in the town for the night. They must have been wet and tired.
The rain ceased however and on Thursday (November 19th), in calm and delightful weather, the men rested. It was the first real halt since leaving Narbonne and, in view of the laborious journeys and work of the preceding days, they needed a pause for recuperation.
Now that the Anglo-Gascon army was encamped west of the Garonne, a new phase of the military situation opened. Jean d'Armagnac had not forced an encounter, nor sent his men upstream to oppose a crossing of either of the formidable rivers, nor taken any effectual steps to hinder the progress of the raiding force which had continued its destructive practices within a few miles of the great strongholds of Carcassonne and Toulouse. He could not now bar the route to Bordeaux but he might seek to embarrass the retiring army by attacks on detachments, by breaking bridges, by harassing the rearguard. This he did. The evidence however is not sufficient to permit a reconstruction of his tactics—which were doubtless opportunist—nor an assessment of their results, save that they very materially increased the difficulties of the prince's task.
The difficulties were due to the season of the year and the load of booty his men had acquired. By this time, the hours of daylight were short, wintry weather had begun, roads were soft, rivers were swollen and he could not expect to find a bridge standing anywhere. Yet he must contrive to get his men into the warmth and shelter of winter quarters as soon as possible, and must resist the temptation to chase attackers back toward Toulouse. The first need was to choose a good route.
The route actually followed from Carbonne to Bordeaux may well have been the best. Baker writes boastfully of some skirmishes and small engagements but, behind his words, may be read the hardships of the march and a determination on the prince's part to avoid a large-scale action. Moreover he reveals, though tersely, the difficulty of crossing the rivers. At the Garonne itself, the movement had been as smooth as a drill (equites singuli, successive . . . transierunf). At the tributaries, scattered men sought a hazardous crossing where they thought it might be possible (transierunt districte…; cum districcione magna…). In one place, he states clearly that it was hoped that a river the army had crossed would serve as a barrier against the enemy.74 Further, there were three bad nights—two in places without water and the third in a place where they arrived very late and passed the darkness in expectation of a battle on the morrow. Between Thursday, November 19th, and Sunday, November 28th, there was only one rest day and the average distance covered works out at about twelve miles a day. This does not differ greatly from the pauses and distances in the earlier part of the campaign but, when allowance is made for the conditions under which they were now travelling, it will be inferred that for both men and horses these days formed a period of great discomfort.
There was contact between sections of the armies on Friday, Saturday and Sunday (November 2oth, 21st, 22nd). French forces had moved out of Toulouse—probably with the intention of making an attack on the English flank or of pressing the English back to the river. News of the French movement reached the English camp during the night of Thursday-Friday. The prince says that Jean d'Armagnac, the Constable of France, the Marshal Clermont and the whole French force camped within two leagues of the English rearguard. Baker says it was known that the French were divided into five strong columns. On Friday morning, a party of eighty lances under Burghersh, Audley, Chandos and Botetourt, was sent out to gain information and, in a skirmish, captured more than thirty French knights (including the Count of Comminges), killed many waggoners and destroyed their provisions. A considerable body of French troops then retired, not towards Toulouse but westward. Later in the day, a few were found taking refuge in the church of Mauvezin where their right of refuge was respected. (They were deprived of their arms and their horses, but not held to ransom.) The greater part however fled across the Save, broke the bridges and encamped in safety on the river bank at Lombez and Sauveterre where, in the light of their fires, they could be seen by the English troops encamped on the eastern bank, 'but there was between them and us a great, deep river'.76
The following day (21st) these French troops moved northward. The English also—still east of the Save—moved under pouring rain down the narrow and difficult roads in the valleys of the Aussonne and the Save as far as Aurade and on Sunday (22nd) crossed their former track (the high road from Auch to Toulouse), forded the Save and towards dusk, approached Gimont. Here, however, the French troops were able to impose a check. Well placed on a hill outside the town, they offered sufficient resistance to hold the English force at bay till midnight. During the delay some English troops were sent five miles upstream and gained possession ofAurimont. Here the main body spent an uncomfortable night while the vanguard passed what few hours remained at Celymont. The French had diverted the army from its shortest route to its objective and had not given up Gimont. The opposing forces were near enough for another engagement.
Another engagement was certainly expected on the English side. Before sunrise, on the following morning (23rd), while the transport men were kept in Aurimont, the whole fighting force was arrayed for battle in the fields. There they remained for hours till a reconnoitring body brought news that the greater part of the French force had withdrawn from Gimont during the night. The fortress itself, though lightly garrisoned, was strong enough to endure a long siege.
The prince's council was assembled to consider policy. 'And, forasmuch as we perceived that they would not have fighting, it was agreed that we ought to draw to our marches.' 78 But there was no relief yet for the troops. They crossed the Gimone and the Arrats and on Tuesday (24th), after a long day's march, they had to bivouac in open country. Here, once more, they were short of water. Horses, allowed to slake their thirst in wine, died and the work of transport became even more laborious. The enemy were still following up and it was with great difficulty that the scattered groups managed to cross the Gers. That flood, it was hoped, might serve as an obstacle to the enemy. They then forced their way into Réjaumont (25th) and had their first rest since leaving the bank of the Garonne (Thursday, 26th). Here a prisoner captured from the French, reported that between Jean d'Armagnac and the Constable of France there was deep disagreement, the latter reproaching the former for his inactivity and for the unworthy performance of his troops.77
Friday (27th) was spent in another long march and a difficult crossing of the Baise. From their various camps south of Condom, they were gathered on Saturday morning (28th) to cross the swollen Osse and enter the thickly wooded country which lay on the western boundary of Armagnac.
At last the army had reached the march land and the enemy had ceased to follow. Arduous and dangerous though the closing phases of the march had been, they had not wholly prevented the work of destruction, for firing a town required little time and effort. Aurade had been burnt. Rejaumont had had to be taken by force and therefore (ideo, says Baker) it was burnt.78
But the campaign was now at an end. Standards were furled. Prompt steps were taken to liberate the Gascon sections of the army. Before they left, the prince promised them another expedition for the following summer and even greater 'profit'. They expressed their satisfaction and their willingness to follow his lead. Then all the Bearnais troops and many of the Gascons were allowed to return to their homes.
Saturday night (28th) and all Sunday (29th) the English and Welsh troops spent at Mezin. It was now neither necessary nor permissible to forage. Supplies of bread, hay and oats were obtained by payment. Nor, of course, was it permissible to fire houses. For one that was burnt, compensation was paid.79 Monday (30th) was spent in a long march through the moorland to Casteljaloux and on Tuesday (December 1st) the force pushed on northward through the forests, one section (led by paid guides) going to the abbey of Montpouillan and the other straight to La Réole.
At La Reole, the prince's council, in formal session, decided the location of winter quarters and a few days later the prince reached Bordeaux.
As for the booty, though Froissart emphasizes the quantity and regards the Gascons as very grasping, he gives no details of its disposal. Probably very many of the articles were regarded as individual possessions. His summary is 'You should know that in this journey, the prince and his men had very great profit',80 and it was this kind of profit to which the prince referred in his farewell remarks to the Gascon troops.
Assessments of the character and importance of the chevauchee have varied widely. Though the sources are almost entirely English (or, as in Froissart's chronicle, broadly favourable to the English cause), there has been no dispute over the three main features of the operation, namely that an Anglo-Gascon force proceeded from Bordeaux to Narbonne; that it did very much damage and that no French force resisted it. It is concerning the purpose of the expedition, the means employed and the reasons for the inaction of the French leaders that differences of view have been advanced.
These differences spring largely from two circumstances. In the first place, to some minds the whole episode is paradoxical. A large army moved across hundreds of miles of 'enemy' territory without fighting a battle. Such an operation, they feel, cannot justly be regarded as military. (Military historians have largely ignored it. Oman dismisses it in two sentences.) Moreover, this army, fully equipped for war, used its energies in pillage and destruction. Such activities offend the moral sense of modern times and therefore lead to unqualified condemnation. Further, the man whose status and domains made him the natural, and whose royal appointment made him the official, protector of the region, witnessed this army at its evil work and did not oppose it. His inaction seems inexplicable.
The second (and less important) circumstance lies in the nature of French studies of the campaign.81 By most careful work, French scholars, studying the prince's movements in their own localities, have gone very far in the identification of Baker's place-names and thus produced a more accurate itinerary than would have been possible for English scholars. Their researches, though gaining in detail, have suffered somewhat in breadth. Concentrating on the activities of English troops in limited areas, they have lacked the perspective of the broad, national, and indeed international, background.
Now, it is only against the full background of the Anglo-French conflict that a just view may be gained. We gather up here, therefore, some earlier passages on the aims of the force.
The campaign in the south was part of a three-pronged attack on France conceived in the minds of Edward III and his counsellors. Though the functions of the three prongs are not recorded (and, by modern minds, perhaps not readily inferred), it must be held that they were considered to form a strategic whole. In any case, France was as vulnerable in the south as in the north and a blow struck from Bordeaux might (as the event showed) prove as effectual as one struck from Calais or Saint Vaast de la Hogue. Coinciding in time with the other attacks, it should serve to divert French forces from the north. It was a military means for the achievement of the great political end, namely the pure sovereignty of the English monarch in those regions he claimed to rule independently of the French crown.
Given this general aim and Bordeaux as the base, the prince's counsellors had decided that the blow should be struck first in the county of Armagnac. By bringing retribution on a persistent opponent of the English cause, it would serve as a demonstration of England's might. But the conception of the work to be undertaken may be seen in the financial arrangements. Half a year's wages and fees had been paid in advance and another half year's wages and fees had been guaranteed. The great engine of war had not been set in motion for a mere ten days' work in the ravaging of a single county. Military and financial provision had been made for a much greater campaign. The lesson taught in Armagnac could be driven home much deeper in French territory. Moreover, the leaders enjoyed the work. Far from avoiding a fight, they were seeking one. They moved straight toward Toulouse, waited a whole day within ten miles of that city and, being no doubt well informed by scouts that Jean d'Armagnac proposed to remain within its walls, decided to advance along the great main road of southern France. Their purpose was still political but their military objective was vague. It might be Carcassonne, Narbonne, Beziers, Montpellier or even Avignon. (Fear of their approach did, in fact, spread along that artery of communication.) The council would decide in the light of circumstances. After the intelligence received near Capestang, the council's decision was clear: the army would return to Bordeaux, taking with it as much as possible of the great quantity of valuables it had gathered on its march.
Yet the original purpose of the campaign had been clouded by the circumstances of the march. French writers have indeed regarded both this campaign and that of 1356 as having no aim but pillage and devastation of enemy territory, and Mr. Belloc has been cited in support of this view since he stated that the prince regarded towns as "objects for plunder." These judgments arise from mistaking the means for the end. Edward III had not financed this expedition, nor had the leaders embarked on it, solely for pillage and devastation. If Jean d'Armagnac had emerged in force from Toulouse on October 26th or 26th, the prince might never have crossed the Garonne. Jean's resolute inactivity facilitated the worst deeds of the invader, deprived both sides of military glory and gave the enterprise an appearance which has deceived subsequent generations.
We are now in a position to review the campaign as a whole. Viewed as a military operation, it was successful. A march of four hundred miles across enemy territory, accompanied by systematic devastation was carried through with scarcely a check. If French forces had sustained no decisive defeat, it was because they had not ventured to oppose the invaders. If it brought little military glory to the English, it spelt deep humiliation to the French. That the campaign 'had not conquered a region' is true but irrelevant. Conquest was not its purpose. That 'the prince's enterprise was absurd' is a view we need not discuss, for it is founded on a misconception.82 That his campaign lacked a strategic plan is in some degree true, but it is almost a truism of all warfare in the fourteenth century.
Viewed in the light of political considerations, again the campaign was successful, for the Gascon subjects of King Edward were strengthened and exalted in their loyalty, and ready for another such operation in the following year.
A still further aspect of the campaign was regarded with satisfaction because of its consequences for France. The region in which the Anglo-Gascon army had operated was rich and assessed highly for taxation. The complete destruction of Carcassonne, the virtual destruction of Narbonne and a score of other towns would cause a very serious loss of revenue for the French crown. To the prince's advisers, this aspect, verified from the tax-accounts found in the towns they had occupied, was very gratifying.
Finally, by pillage collected and by money exacted as ransoms or the price of immunity from attack, very many members of the expedition had been enriched. National advantage and personal advantage had been combined. Service with the prince had its rewards.
Concerning the prince's methods of campaigning, two broad condemnations have been made by French critics: he avoided battles and sieges, and he resorted to pillage and destruction.83 With the absence of battles in this autumn chevauchee, we have already dealt. The responsibility lay with Jean d'Armagnac. But the era furnishes other examples of unwillingness to stake all on a decisive encounter. In the strange episode at Buironfosse, the kings of England and France had agreed on the date and site of a battle, but it did not take place. Even in the autumn of 1355, when King Edward invaded northern France, King John did not force an engagement on the invader. And in 1359, when Edward again invaded France, the dauphin Charles avoided battle. The policy of Jean d'Armagnac, therefore, was not necessarily inconsistent with the military practices of his age. We will return to his circumstances later.
The avoidance of sieges was a feature of the typical raid. In his classic campaign of 1346, Edward III did not assault castles or closed towns. He 'passed by the strong castle of Rolleboise' and he 'passed by the city of Beauvais'.84 Sieges were costly in time; assaults were costly in soldiers and artillery. A fortress situated in a mountain pass or at the bridge over a broad river was an unavoidable obstacle, but a leader who boldly got his men across a river without a bridge, or was prepared to incur the risks inherent in leaving an enemy garrison in his rear, was defying the conventional limitations of movement. He cannot justly be reproached for such initiative.
Concerning the charge of pillage and destruction, a threefold answer may be made. First, it is of course true. Secondly, as M. Perroy has recently pointed out,85 if a chevauchee of several thousand men enters enemy territory and is not met in a pitched battle, all it can do is to pillage: it cannot conquer, still less occupy the territory. Thirdly, these practices were not innovations devised by the prince and his men for use against the people of Languedoc. They were, as we have shown, regular features of fourteenth-century warfare and regarded as legitimate and even honourable. The prince and his chief followers had learned the art of campaigning from Edward III. They were 'very eager and desirous to acquit themselves well'. They were in fact the 'flower of chivalry' and many were members of the Order of the Garter. That the 'flower of chivalry' should spend a Sunday with a devout brotherhood at Prouille, while their men only a few miles away were burning down the homes of the burgesses of Limoux, was not incongruous to the mind of 1355. They were neither better nor worse than the men of their age and, when the duty of conducting operations fell to them, they experienced the satisfaction and even the pride that comes from the efficient execution of almost routine tasks. 'We took our road', the prince wrote, 'through the land of Toulouse where were many goodly towns and strongholds burnt and destroyed, for the land was very rich and plenteous; and there was not a day but towns, castles and strongholds were taken. . . .'8B
To Wengfeld, no soldier but a very experienced steward, who viewed property as the source of revenue, the soldiers' work was gratifying. 'Since this war began', he wrote, 'there was never such loss nor destruction as hath been in this raid'. The taxes provided by the areas now devastated had, he declared, supported a very large part of the French army. He had had access to the revenue records in the captured towns and was, therefore, looking beyond the immediate damage to the future war potential. Further, Wengfeld went on, 'my lord hath not lost in all this march, knight or squire save only my Lord of Lisle who was slain...' 87
Moreover, the baggage train of heavily laden beasts and overloaded vehicles had conveyed the valuables gathered during the long journey, safely to the English base. As Froissart declared, the expedition had brought 'much profit'.
Seen through English eyes, the mission entrusted to the prince had prospered. Great damage had been inflicted on the enemy; the men had returned to their base; the cost in life had been negligible and there was a good store of plunder. Regular methods systematically employed had produced the usual results. Daring policy had been crowned with success. And, if the prince occasionally wrote contemptuously of his opponents' courage, they had displayed little enough. Judged by the standards of the time, the prince had carried through a model raid.
Seen through French eyes, however, the prince's work must have been heart-rending. Though direct evidence from genuine French sources is scanty, it confirms and complements that obtained from English sources and from Froissart. From the one side we have descriptions of the destruction of flourishing towns and small fortresses; from the other instructions for rebuilding or repair. And the promptitude and urgency of the measures taken, form evidence of the calamitous extent of the damage.
The great fire at Carcassonne was started on November 6th. On November 22nd King John sent a letter of sympathy to the citizens and on the same day an order to the Count of Armagnac directing him to take immediate steps to rebuild the town and put it in a state of defence against future attack. In order to raise funds for the work, the Count authorized the levying of tolls on goods brought into the town, and the task was completed by April 1359.
Before the summer of 1356, similar measures were in hand for the rebuilding of Castelnaudary, Alzonne, Limoux and Narbonne. Among the measures taken to raise money, to ease burdens and to facilitate the work, were the allocation of fines to the expenses of building, the exemption of the inhabitants for a period from the payment of various dues, deferment for the repayment of debts, the impressment of carpenters and masons, and the right to take timber in the royal forests for the building of churches and hospitals. There is specific reference to the rebuilding of mills and to the drafting of documents intended to replace those destroyed in the fires.89 The need for all this constructive activity points to the great material damage these towns had suffered.
The most enduring effects, however, were not material. Buildings might be replaced but memories remained, and though there is probably no dreadful deed recorded of Languedoc in 1355 but could be paralleled by deeds in Normandy in 1346, the southern raid left a more painful and more lasting scar than the great raid of King Edward. Between the two campaigns there were differences in the season (summer in 1346, autumn in 1355), in the armies employed, and in the racial stock and previous history of the populations affected. The prince's army was an Anglo-Gascon body, the king's almost entirely English. The prince's command was subject in some degree to conciliar control, or, at least, assent; the king's was unfettered. Moreover, the prince's army included men who had a personal grievance against Armagnac. It may well be that the mixed troops of 1355; were held in slacker reins as they sped the work of destruction than were the troops of King Edward. Gross spoilers as were the latter, they witnessed the king's sternness when they overstepped prescribed bounds. When, for example, in contravention of orders, the abbey of Saint Lucien (Messien) near Beauvais was destroyed in 1346, the king promptly hanged a score of them.90 Baker, however, records the prince's inability to prevent the burning of Seissan.91 He also mentions the destruction of church property in several places and, in particular, at Carcassonne where explicit orders for its preservation had been given. Even the incendiary strokes appear livelier in the narratives of 1355 than in those of 1346 for, whereas Baker mentions firing nine times in the earlier raid and uses the same word (comburo) eight times, in describing the later raid he makes seventeen allusions to the practice but contrives to use a dozen different phrases (burnt, went up in flames, consigned to the flames, burnt to ashes, etc.) to describe it.
We can make no comparison of the methods employed by the soldiers in the two raids, but Froissart leaves vivid pictures of the sack of towns in Languedoc—the wanton ('they took what they liked and burnt the rest'), the discriminating ('disregarded clothing and went only for silver plate and cash'), the indiscriminate ('nothing of value remained. They carried off everything, especially the Gascons, who are very grasping.').92
Scenes of this kind must have been burnt into the memories of thousands of people and, when they were accompanied by personal violence and even slaughter, Froissart himself, usually so tolerant of soldierly excesses and so indifferent to the lot of common people, is moved to feeling. At Montgiscard, after mentioning the ill-treatment of men, women and children, he adds, 'It was an occasion for pity.' 93 The men and women of Toulouse (who did not suffer an attack) are described as 'dispirited, and with good reason, for they knew not yet what war was',9* and the people living east of that city (who felt the full weight of the raid) were 'good, simple folk who did not know war, for they had never had war made upon them'.95 Baker comments in similar terms on the people living beyond the Garonne: they were temperamentally unwarlike. To the consuls of Carcassonne, King John sent a letter of sympathy, in which he said he had full information about their overwhelming disaster and innumerable losses.96 And Wengfeld, summing up the situation at the end of the raid, said 'our enemies are sore astonished'.97 Mentally and morally unprepared to bear with fortitude the horror, misery and grief inseparable from war, they had seen their great bridges broken down, their suburbs razed, their stores plundered, their cities burnt, their valuables stolen and, in many instances, their fellows killed. The swift-moving, devastating power moved on unresisted, irresistible, spreading havoc wherever it went. Winter found them mourning, bewildered and fearful for the morrow. The ruthless invaders had remained on French soil and were active even in mid-winter; their odious allies were but a few leagues away in Beam and Gascony. The terrible episode might be repeated unless a powerful protector arose.
The man responsible for the protection of the region was Jean d'Armagnac, now about forty years of age. As a young man he had gained military experience in the defence of the Holy See and he had taken part in the early stages of the Hundred Years War in Flanders and Normandy. With him may be associated, in some measure, Jaques de Bourbon, Constable of France and Jean de Clermont, Marshal of France and military commander of the region between the Loire and the Dordogne. Frenchmen have not been slow to note (and often to condemn) the policy these leaders followed in the autumn of 1355. M. Jeanjean cites three French writers of the seventeenth century and one of the eighteenth, all of whom were bewildered that men in command of forces numerically superior to those of the prince, failed to attack him." More modern scholars are equally at a loss for an explanation.
At least four reasons have been advanced to account for the inactivity of Jean d'Armagnac,100 namely:
(1) That he was secretly in league with the English.
(2) That he was a coward.
(3) That he and Jaques de Bourbon were at variance about the course to be followed.
(4) That in view of the general situation, great prudence was necessary.
It is most improbable that he had a secret understanding with the English. Though his loyalty to the French cause was not absolute, he had furthered French interests during his lieutenancy, was rightly trusted (according to Froissart) by the people of Toulouse, and could hardly have retained any pro-English sentiment after hearing the stories of the refugees who fled before the prince's devastating army to the shelter of Toulouse.
Concerning his courage, we have no evidence to support or refute the view. It is, however, necessary to distinguish between knightly bravery per se and responsible leadership.
The third and fourth reasons may be considered together. That there was disharmony among the French leaders is likely. A prisoner captured in the closing days of the campaign, reported that there was deep disagreement between Armagnac and the Constable who is said to have reproached him that he had done nothing for France and that his soldiers had repeatedly and shamefully taken to flight. If that be true, the responsibility for policy falls wholly on Jean d'Armagnac.
Kindly critics find some difficulty in defending Jean's policy. His position, however, deserves examination. Notwithstanding assertions of the earlier writers that he had greater forces under his command than had the prince, we have no accurate figures of the strength of either side. Moreover, the equivocal attitude of his rival, the Count of Foix (who actually welcomed the prince on November 17th within thirty miles of Toulouse), must have given Jean grounds for caution. His own policy of destroying houses outside the city walls may have made him unpopular. Froissart states that the citizens of Toulouse desired to fight but that he restrained them, holding that they were quite unfit to match themselves against the experienced troops in the prince's army.101 It is likely that he had not envisaged the possibility that the prince might, or even could, cross the Garonne. And, if he felt unsure of his power to defeat the prince's force, he may well have decided that it was wiser to save his resources than to plunge rashly into action which must end in calamity. Chivalry lauded boldness in the individual but paid less attention to the further qualities needed in the general. Jean was not alone, as we have shown, in avoiding pitched battles and, if his role in the autumn of 1355 was inglorious, it was less disastrous for France than the leadership which had brought her so low at Crecy and was to bring her still lower at Poitiers.
Отправлено 4/12/2002 20:33 (#15809 - в ответ на #15791) Тема: А слабо напрячься перевести?
Тут все-таки не англоязычный сайт. В крайнем случае, можно было бы изложить короче и своими словами, но по-русски. Не все ведь натренировались легко читать такие тексты в оригинале.
В конце концов, все английские произведения один к одному тут все равно не выложишь, и задача форума заключается не в этом.
Отправлено 4/12/2002 22:22 (#15820 - в ответ на #15812) Тема: Izvinite,Gospoda choroshie,
Vy by luchshe poblagodarili Maksima Nechitaylova za to, chto on delaet bolee dostupnym tekst iz takogo tzennogo issledovaniia, kak Hewitt
I ogromnya pros'ba k Maksimu Net li u Vas informatzii iz Hewitt'a , kasaiuzheysya kampaniy Bertrand'a DuGuescelin'a, i v pervuiiu golovu srazheniiia u Pont Valaine(1370) i Chizay(1373) Prezhde vsego, interesuet takticheskiy aspekt